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BANKRUPT'S STANDING TO SUE FOR LOSSES
CAUSED BY BANKRUPTCY
In Reichert v. General Insurance Co. of America,' the Su-
preme Court of California held that the trustee in bankruptcy
was vested with the bankrupt insured's claim against fire insurers
for loss due to bankruptcy caused by the insurer's failure to
promptly settle. The majority of a divided court held that the
bankrupt had no standing to sue despite the fact that the damage
sustained occurred after he had gone into bankruptcy. The case
raises the question of when, if ever, a bankrupt has standing
to sue for damages suffered after bankruptcy but caused by
wrongful failure to settle an insurance claim prior to bankruptcy.
2
The purpose of this Note is to examine this area of the law and
evaluate the Reichert decision in light of that examination.
In Reichert, the owner of a heavily mortgaged motel was
forced into bankruptcy as a result of the failure of his insurers to
fulfill their obligations under the contract of insurance. The ques-
tion is whether the damage suffered in losing his equity in the
motel when he was forced into bankruptcy Was grounds for a
separate and distinct cause of action vesting in the bankrupt. To
resolve this problem one must first look to the federal statute. The
pertinent part of the Bankruptcy Act, section 703 reads:
(a) The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt ... shall
... be vested by operation of law with the title of the
bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the petition initi-
ating a process under this title . . . to all the following
kinds of property wherever located.
1. 442 P.2d 860, 69 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1968).
2. Plaintiff Reichert purchased a motel worth $1,500,000 and, as part
of the transaction, received assignments of four insurance policies then in
effect. Nineteen days after the plaintiff purchased the motel a fire
caused $424,000 worth of damage, but the defendant insurance companies
refused to honor the plaintiff's claim. The plaintiff was adjudicated an
involuntary bankrupt, after which an $850,000 deed of trust on the motel
was foreclosed. Charging that the defendant's actions were made pur-
suant to a conspiracy to defraud him, the plaintiff asked for actual dam-
ages of $1,500,000 and punitive damages of $5,000,000. The District Court
of Appeals sustained the defendant's demurrers on the ground, among
others, that the plaintiff lacked the capacity to sue. 53 Cal. Rptr. 693
(1966). The Supreme Court reversed, 428 P.2d 860, 59 Cal. Rptr. 724
(1967), but on rehearing vacated its original opinion and affirmed the
decision sustaining the demurrers. 442 P.2d 860, 69 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1968).
Although the issue presented in Reichert serves as a basis for this
Note, the scope of this examination is expanded to include areas that were
not covered by that case.
3. 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1964).
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. (5) property, including rights of action, which prior
to the filing of the petition he could by any means have
transferred or which might have been levied upon and sold
under judicial process against him, or otherwise seized,
impounded or sequestered. . . . (6) rights of action aris-
ing upon contracts, or usury, or the unlawful taking or
detention of or injury to his property.
If the right of action arose prior to the petition in bankruptcy,
under this section of the Bankruptcy Act the trustee acquires
title to the property (right of action) at the time the petition is
filed.4 Conversely, if the property is acquired subsequent to the
filing of the petition it is after-acquired property belonging to
the bankrupt,5 clear of any claims discharged by the bankruptcy.,
The bankrupt's property will pass to the trustee if such property
could have been transferred by the bankrupt 7 or levied upon and
sold under judicial process against him, or otherwise seized, im-
pounded, or sequestered.8 If either of these conditions are met,
the property will pass to the trustee;9 otherwise it will not.10
The alternatives open to the bankrupt in the Reichert situ-
ation are (1) to bring a contract action based on breach of the
insurance contract; (2) bring an ex delicto action for "personal
injury" which will not normally pass to the trustee in bank-
ruptcy; or (3) show that the trustee has abandoned the right of
action in which case the bankrupt himself may bring the suit.
These possibilities will be considered in order.
BANKRUPT'S RIGHTS IN CONTRACT
Insurance is essentially a personal contract to pay money to
4. Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966); Allen v. Watkins, 234 F.2d
925 (5th Cir. 1956); In re Lustron Corp., 184 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 946 (1951); Tuffy v. Nichols, 120 F.2d 906 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 660 (1941); In re Park Beach Hotel Bldg. Corp., 96
F.2d 886 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 638 (1938); 4A COLLIER, BANK-
RUPTCY § 70.07 (14th ed. 1967).
5. See, e.g., Sparhawk v. Yerkes, 142 U.S. 1 (1891); 4A COLLIER,
BANKRUPTCY § 70.09 (14th ed. 1967).
6. 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 17.30 (14th ed. 1967) and cases cited
therein.
7. Whether or not the property can be transferred is determined
by the applicable state law. Adelman v. Centaur Corp., 145 F.2d 573
(6th Cir. 1944); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Menin, 115 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. 1940);
In re Landis, 41 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1930).
8. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a)(5); 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (5) (1964). See,
e.g., Young v. Handwork, 179 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1949); Adelman v. Cen-
taur Corp., 145 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1944); In re Baxter, 104 F.2d 318 (6th
Cir. 1939).
9. See, e.g., Young v. Handwork, 179 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1949); Adel-
man v. Centaur Corp., 145 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1944).
10. See, e.g., In re Baxter, 104 F.2d 318 (6th Cir. 1939).
protect the insured," involving contractual security against antici-
pated loss.'2 A cause of action is deemed to accrue when facts
exist which enable one party to maintain an action against another
party.13 A cause of action arising out of contractual relations
normally accrues as soon as the contract or agreement is breached,
that is, when there is a failure to do the thing agreed. 14 Where
the failure to do the thing agreed is the failure to promptly settle
a claim, and that failure is the cause of the bankruptcy, the
breach of contract must necessarily occur prior to the bankruptcy.
Since the breach occurs prior to the bankruptcy, the cause of ac-
tion on that breach will vest in the trustee.
15
The question then arises as to whether the bankrupt has a
separate cause of action which may properly be severed from the
cause of action on the original breach of contract. The general
rule is that a plaintiff must recover all damages arising from the
operative facts in a single action. 16 A single cause of action, being
a violation of one fundamental right, may not be split and used
as a basis for separate suits. 7 This is true even though a plaintiff
may not have suffered all his foreseeable damages.' 8 He must
prove not only such damage as has already been suffered but also
prospective damages to which he may legally be entitled. 19 Sim-
ilarly, the bankrupt has but a single cause of action which accrues
at the time the contract was breached. He will not be allowed to
split the cause of action so that the damages resulting from bank-
ruptcy would be a new cause of action accruing at the time the
petition was filed.
In Reichert, the bankrupt asserts that he is seeking recovery
for damages which were caused by his going into bankruptcy. Al-
though numerous exceptions are cited to the general rule that a
11. Utica v. Park-Mill Corp., 41 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1943).
12. Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n., 107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
13. See, e.g., Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Louis Lesser Enterprises, Inc., 353
F.2d 997 (8th Cir. 1965).
14. See, e.g., Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Louis Lesser Enterprises, Inc., 353
F.2d 997 (8th Cir. 1965); H.P. Cummings Const. Co. v. Marbleoid Co., 51
F.2d 906 (3d Cir. 1931); Guild v. Hopkins, 271 App. Div. 234, 63 N.Y.S.2d
522 (1946); Guarantee Trust and Safe Deposit Co. v. Home Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 180 Pa. Super. 1, 117 A.2d 824 (1955). But see note 31 infra.
15. "It is clear that a 'cause of action' is an asset or a property right
of the individual to whom it belongs. It is equally clear that, under the
Bankruptcy Act, the title to a 'cause of action' which belongs to the indi-
vidual prior to bankruptcy passed to the trustee in bankruptcy .... "
Gochenour v. George & Francis Ball Foundation, 35 F. Supp. 508, 514
(S.D. Ind. 1940), aff'd, 117 F.2d 259 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 566
(1941).
16. See, e.g., Cream Top Creamery v. Dean Milk Co., 383 F.2d 358
(6th Cir. 1967); Woodbury v. Porter, 158 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1946); Abbott
v. 76 Land & Water Co., 161 Cal. 42, 118 P. 425 (1911); McCaffery v. Wiley,
103 Cal. App. 2d 621, 230 P.2d 152 (1951).
17. Abbott v. 76 Land & Water Co., 161 Cal. 42, 118 P. 425 (1911);
McCaffery v. Wiley, 103 Cal. App. 2d 621, 230 P.2d 152 (1951).




cause of action in contract accrues at the time of the breach,2"
this line of reasoning is fallacious. Analogizing Reichert to the
prime authority cited for the proposition that a cause of action
will not arise until the time of the injury will not help in the
situation at hand. Reichert did, however, attempt to analogize his
situation to those found in Comunale v. Traders & General Insur-
ance Co.2 and Brown v. Guarantee Insurance Co. 22 These two
cases involved insurance companies wrongfully denying coverage
of claims by third persons against the insured, and on that basis,
refusing settlements within the policy limits. Judgments in ex-
cess of the policy limits were subsequently recovered against the
insured parties. It was held that a cause of action for wrongful
refusal to settle accrued at the time of the injury when the
judgments in excess of the policy limits became final, and not at
the time of the wrongful conduct.
These cases are, however, easily distinguishable from the Rei-
chert situation. Although a cause of action generally accrues at
the time of the wrongful act, before the act can be wrongful there
must be an invasion of the rights of the injured party.2 In
Linkenhoger v. American Fidelity & Casualty Co.,24 a situation sim-
ilar to Comunale and Brown, the court said that the petitioner
could not have maintained this present suit until such
time as his liability and the extent thereof had been deter-
mined by a final judgment in the former case. Until then
his rights had not been invaded by respondent's failure to
accept the terms of the settlement offered and the tort
was not complete.
25
In the present situation, as soon as the defendant insurance com-
panies refused to settle, a right of action arose in favor of the
bankrupt. By virtue of his inability to collect the money due
under the policies, he suffered immediate loss, even though the
extent of his loss could not then be determined. By contrast, in
Comunale, Brown, and Linkenhoger, the insured suffered no im-
mediate legal detriment when the insurers refused to settle. If
the third party suit against the insured had resulted in a judgment
for the third party, but within the limits of the insurance policies,
the insured would never have suffered any loss. It was not until
a judgment was handed down which exceeded the policy limits
20. See note 31 infra.
21. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
22. 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957).
23. Linkenhoger v. American Fidelity & Cas. Co., 152 Tex. 534, 260
S.W.2d 884 (1953).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 539, 260 S.W.2d at 887.
that the plaintiff suffered any loss. Therefore, there was no right
of action until the time of the injury, even though the injury
stemmed from the defendant's wrongful conduct at some time
prior to the injury.
Closer on point, and cited as authority that a separate cause
of action vests in the bankrupt for damage sustained after bank-
ruptcy is Wooten v. Central Mutual Insurance Co.26 In that
case, an insured party under an automobile liability policy was
forced into bankruptcy as a result of a judgment in excess of the
policy limits. The trustee in bankruptcy, in addition to seeking
recovery of the excessive portion of the judgment, claimed a separ-
ate cause of action for damages for loss of reputation and credit of
the bankrupt. The court permitted the trustee to recover the
portion of the judgment in excess of the insurance policy but held
that a separate cause of action for the bankrupt's loss of credit
and reputation vested in the bankrupt and could not be brought by
the trustee. The damage was sustained as a result of the bank-
ruptcy and, thus, after the petition of bankruptcy was filed. The
cause of action therefore accrued at the time of the filing for
bankruptcy, which was the time of the injury and not the time of
the wrongful conduct which caused the injury.
Wooten, although more difficult to distinguish, is still not
persuasive. The great weight of authority is contra. The case
appears to be based on a peculiarity of Louisiana law which
recognizes a distinct and separate cause of action for recovery of
damages for loss of reputation and credit. The more persuasive
position is taken in Patton v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. 27 In
a factual setting similar to Wooten, the court held that there was
no separate cause of action for impairment of credit and repu-
tation. The gravamen of the action arose in contract and the
cause of action therefore vested in the trustee under section 70 (a)
(6) of the Bankruptcy Act.2 s
Moreover, Wooten is not persuasive authority as the claim
there is fundamentally different from the Reichert case. The
separate cause of action in Wooten was for loss of reputation and
credit while in Reichert it was for recovery of damages for loss of
property. Although the Wooten court specifically declined to de-
cide the case on this distinction, a cause of action for injury to
reputation and credit has been held to be a "personal injury"
which would not vest in the trustee anyway.29 A cause of action
for damage to property will, however, vest in the trustee.A0
There are, of course, many other examples showing that a
26. 182 So. 2d 146 (La. App. 1966).
27. 246 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
28. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (6) (1964).
29. Boudreau v. Chesley, 135 F.2d 623 (1st Cir. 1943); Gurfein v.
Howell, 142 Va. 197, 128 S.E. 644 (1925). See discussion on p. 693 infra.
30. Bankruptcy Act § 70; 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1964).
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cause of action, under the proper circumstances, accrues at the
time of the injury, and not the time of the wrongful conduct which
causes the injury.8s In each of the cases cited, there was a com-
pelling reason why it should stand as an exception to the general
rule, either because none of the plaintiff's rights were invaded by
the wrongful conduct, 2 or the injury could not, with reasonable
diligence, be discovered until sometime after the wrongful con-
duct,8 ' or some other reason such as a suspension of a cause of
action pending the outcome of third party litigation.14 Therefore,
if a separate cause of action is to be allowed for the bankrupt for
damages caused by bankruptcy, some compelling reason must be
found to justify an exception to the rule that the cause of action
accrues at the time of the breach. There appears to be none. The
bankrupt knew that the failure of the insurance companies to settle
his claim immediately invaded his right under the insurance con-
tract. He suffered immediate detriment. The act which caused
his detriment was not concealed from him in any way. He should
have been aware of the fact that he had a right of action. In such
a case there is no practical consideration which warrants departure
from the general rule.
If this suit is to be an action in contract then it must be
recognized that the cause of action accrued when the insurance
companies breached the contract. To rule otherwise would be to
confuse a cause of action with consequential damages resulting
from a cause of action. There is no new cause of action simply
31. Examples cited in Reichert include: Tu-Vu Drive-In Corp. v.
Davies, 66 Cal. 2d 435, 426 P.2d 505, 58 Cal. Rptr. 105 (1967); Day v.
Greene, 59 Cal. 2d 404, 380 P.2d 385, 29 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1963); Amen v.
Merced County Title Co., 58 Cal. 2d 528, 375 P.2d 33, 25 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1962);
Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal. 2d 573, 360 P.2d 897, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 257 (1961); Bellman v. County of Contra Costa, 54 Cal. 2d 363, 353
P.2d 300, 5 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1960); Brewer v. Simpson, 53 Cal. 2d 567, 349
P.2d 289, 2 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1960); Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co.,
50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958); Costs v. Southern Pac. Co., 49 Cal. 2d
805, 322 P.2d 460 (1958); Bennett v. Hibernia Bank, 47 Cal. 2d 540, 305 P.2d
20 (1956).
32. Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d
198 (1958); Brown v. Guar. Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69
(1957).
33. Day v. Greene, 59 Cal. 2d 404, 380 P.2d 385, 29 Cal. Rptr. 785
(1963); Amen v. Merced County Title Co., 58 Cal. 2d 528, 375 P.2d 33, 25
Cal. Rptr. 65 (1962); Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal. 2d 573,
360 P.2d 897, 12 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1961); Coots v. Southern Pac. Co., 49
Cal. 2d 805, 322 P.2d 460 (1958); Bennett v. Hibernia Bank, 47 Cal. 2d 540,
305 P.2d 20 (1956). See also Alter v. Michael, 64 Cal. 2d 480, 413 P.2d 153,
50 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1966).
34. Tu-Vu Drive-In Corp. v. Davies, 66 Cal. 2d 435, 426 P.2d 505,
58 Cal. Rptr. 105 (1967).
because new damages result from the original wrong. To conclude
that the bankrupt and not the trustee, takes title to the conse-
quential damages caused by the insurer's delay in payment reaches
the anomalous result of allowing both the trustee and the bank-
rupt to bring suit to recover different elements of damage under
a single cause of action. The insurance companies would then be
subject to multiple litigation based on a single cause of action.
Such a result is contrary to the law.35
Thus if the bankrupt bases his action on breach of the insur-
ance contract, unless some compelling reason would justify ex-
ception to the general rule, there is but a single cause of action
which accrues at the time of the breach and therefore passes to
the trustee.
BANKRUPT'S RIGHTS IN TORT
If the plaintiff cannot show that his cause of action in con-
tract should accrue at the time of the bankruptcy, his alternative
would be to show that he has a separate cause of action not based
on contract, which would not pass to the trustee.
Section 70(a) (5) of the Bankruptcy Act36 sets apart certain
kinds of ex delicto actions which do not normally pass to the
trustee in bankruptcy. These actions are for damages of a more
personal nature-injury to the bankrupt's person, feeling, or repu-
tation-which do not belong to his creditors.3 7 The section reads:
Rights of action ex delicto for libel, slander, injuries to
the person of the bankrupt or of a relative . . . shall not
vest in the trustee unless by the law of the State such
rights of action are subject to attachment, execution,
garnishment, sequestration, or other judicial process ...
It will be noted that a bankrupt's actions for personal injuries
belong solely to him unless the applicable state law subjects such a
right of action to actions by a creditor.3 Since transferability is
determined by state law, no general rule can be laid down with
regard to the bankrupt's standing to sue for possible tort claims.
Actions for impairment of the bankrupt's reputation and credit
have been held to be of such a personal nature so as not to pass to
35. Abbott v. 76 Land & Water Co., 161 Cal. 42, 118 P. 425 (1911);
McCaffery v. Wiley, 103 Cal. App. 2d 621, 230 P.2d 152 (1951).
36. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (5) (1964).
37. See, e.g., Charness v. Katz, 48 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Wis. 1943).
"It is not, and never has been, the policy of the law to coin into money for
the profit of his creditors the bodily pain, mental anguish, or outraged
feelings of a bankrupt." Sibley v. Nason, 196 Mass. 125, 131, 81 N.E. 887,
889 (1907).
38. See, e.g., In re Buda, 323 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1963); In re Leibowitt,
93 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1937). In California, the jurisdiction of Reichert,
even actions based on purely personal injuries, such as for libel and
slander, may vest in the trustee since such actions are subject to judicial
process in California. See also Carmona v. Robinson, 336 F.2d 518 (9th
Cir. 1964); In re Farris, 217 F. Supp. 598 (N.D. Cal. 1963).
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the trustee.3 9 However, where the gravamen of the action arose
in contract, as in the Reichert situation, it has been held that
there is no separate cause of action for impairment of reputation
and credit. Rather, there is a single cause of action which includes
these elements of damage and which is vested in the trustee.
40
Actions for injury which impairs future earning power is
likewise considered to be personal, and, as such, will not normally
pass to the trustee.41 In Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,4 2 the Supreme
Court said ". . . earning power of an individual is the power to
create property; but it is not translated into property within the
meaning of the Bankruptcy Act until it has brought earnings into
existence."4 3 Earning power is in the nature of a personal liberty,
not a property right, and to allow such a right to be transferred to
the use of one's creditors would defeat the purpose of the Bank-
ruptcy Act.
44
Actions for conspiracy to defraud and financially ruin a plain-
tiff are not normally construed as a "personal injury" within the
meaning of the Bankruptcy Act.45 The cases hold that such an
injury lessens the bankrupt's estate, that is, the damage is ac-
tually to the bankrupt's property, not his person.4 Recognizing
39. Boudreau v. Chesley, 135 F.2d 623 (1st Cir. 1943); Gurfein v.
Howell, 142 Va. 197, 128 S.E. 644 (1925); cf., Wooten v. Central Mut. Ins.
Co., 182 So. 2d 146 (La. App. 1966).
40. Patton v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 246 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D.
Pa. 1965).
41. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934); Boudreau v.
Chesley, 135 F.2d 623 (1st Cir. 1943). Injury which impairs future earning
power is considered a "personal injury" on the ground that to give the
creditors power over such rights would place the bankrupt in a kind of
"involuntary servitude" after his supposed discharge. In re Leibowitt, 93
F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1937).
42. 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
43. Id. at 243.
44. Id. at 245.
45. Gochenour v. Cleveland Terminal Bldg., 118 F.2d 89 (6th Cir.
1941); Tamm v. Ford Motor Co., 80 F.2d 723 (8th Cir. 1936); Hermsmeyer
v. A.L.D., Inc., 239 F. Supp. 740 (D. Colo. 1964); Constant v. Kulukundis,
125 F. Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); In re Gay, 182 F. 260 (D. Mass. 1910);
In re Harper, 175 F. 412 (N.D.N.Y. 1910). Although the defendant's fraud
is a possible basis for a separate cause of action, "the failure to perform a
duty prescribed by contract cannot be converted into a tort by reason of
the motive of the party guilty of the breach." Baumgarten v. Alliance
Assur. Co., 159 F. 275, 278 (N.D. Cal. 1908).
46. The courts favor a broad interpretation of section 70 of the
Bankruptcy Act, tending toward increased transferability of the bank-
rupt's property. See, e.g., Gochenour v. Cleveland Terminal Bldg., 118
F.2d 89 (6th Cir. 1941):
The object of the Bankruptcy Act is to benefit creditors by
making all the pecuniary means and property of the bankrupt
available to their payment, and in furtherance of this object, there
the favored broad interpretation of section 70, any injury which
affects the estate of the bankrupt, or that diminishes it in some
way, is deemed to be an injury to the bankrupt's property and not
his person for purposes of transferability to the trustee. However,
a fraud action has been held to be personal and non-assignable
and did not, therefore, pass to the trustee.
47
If the bankrupt is to have a separate action sounding in tort
which does not pass to the trustee, that action must not be trans-
ferable under the law of the state.48 However, if the injury sus-
tained, even though apparently by a personal tort, goes directly
toward diminishing the value of the bankrupt's estate, the courts
will usually determine that this is a right of action arising upon
".. . the unlawful taking or detention of or injury to his property"
49
and will therefore pass to the trustee. 0
ABANDONMENT BY THE TRUSTEE
The only other means by which the bankrupt can acquire the
right to pursue his claim is to show that the right of action was
rejected by the trustee.5 1 Although the trustee is vested with
title to the bankrupt's property when the petition of bankruptcy
is filed,5 2 the trustee is not bound to accept property which he
feels is too burdensome or unprofitable to be of any advantage to
the estate. 3 In such a case, the trustee may abandon the asset, in
which case title reverts to the bankrupt. 4 Normally, it takes
passes to the trustee, not only what in strictness may be called
the property of the bankrupt, but all those rights of action to
which he was entitled for the purpose of recovering real or per-
sonal property, or damages respecting that which has been unlaw-
fully diminished in value, withheld, or taken from him.
Id. at 93; Tamm v. Ford Motor Co., 80 F.2d 723 (8th Cir. 1936); Herms-
meyer v. A.L.D., Inc., 239 F. Supp. 740 (D. Colo. 1964); In re Goodson,
208 F. Supp. 837 (S.D. Cal. 1962); Constant v. Kulukundis, 125 F. Supp.
305 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
47. Jones v. Hicks, 358 Mich. 474, 100 N.W.2d 243 (1960). The court
noted that the decision was based on ". . . the long recognized rule in this
State that an action for damages for fraud may not be prosecuted by an
assignee thereof."
48. See, e.g., In re Buda, 323 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1963); In re Leibowitt,
93 F.2d 33 (3d Cir. 1937).
49. Bankruptcy Act § 70 (a) (6); 11 U.S.C. § 110 (a) (6) (1964).
50. See, e.g., Gochenour v. Cleveland Terminal Bldg., 118 F.2d 89
(6th Cir. 1941); Tamm v. Ford Motor Co., 80 F.2d 723 (8th Cir. 1936);
Hermsmeyer v. A.L.D., Inc., 239 F. Supp. 740 (D. Colo. 1964); In re Goodson,
208 F. Supp. 837 (S.D. Cal. 1962); Constant v. Kulukundis, 125 F. Supp.
305 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
51. See, e.g., Colson v. Monteil, 226 F.2d 614 (8th Cir. 1955); In re
Webb, 54 F.2d 1065 (4th Cir. 1932); United States v. Verrier, 179 F. Supp.
336 (D. Me. 1959); Hill v. Larcon Co., 131 F. Supp. 469 (W.D. Ark. 1955).
52. Bankruptcy Act § 70; 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1964). See note 4 supra.
53. See, e.g., Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Logan, 92 F.2d 28 (5th Cir.
1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 636 (1938).
54. See, e.g., Colson v. Monteil, 226 F.2d 614 (8th Cir. 1955); In re
Webb, 54 F.2d 1065 (4th Cir. 1932); United States v. Verrier, 179 F.Supp.,
336 (D. Me. 1959); Hill v. Larcon Co., 131 F. Supp. 469 (W.D. Ark. 1955).
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an express rejection of the asset by the trustee in order for the
title to that property to revest in the bankrupt.5 5 The burden is
on the bankrupt to show that the property in question has been
abandoned by the trustee.6 Thus, the bankrupt can claim the
right to sue in his own name only if he can show that the trustee
has failed to enforce the claim.
CONCLUSION
Of the possible actions available to the bankrupt for damages
suffered after bankruptcy but caused by wrongful conduct prior to
bankruptcy, only in limited circumstances will the bankrupt have
standing to bring a suit on his own for those damages. There are
two possibilities which would allow a bankrupt to sue: (1) an ac-
tion for personal injuries, such as loss of reputation and credit or
impairment of future earning power, in a state where the right of
action for such injuries is not ". . . subject to attachment, exe-
cution, garnishment, sequestration, or other judicial process;" and
(2) where the bankrupt can show that the trustee has abandoned
the claim. All other rights of action are vested in the trustee in
bankruptcy pursuant to section 70 of the Bankruptcy Act.
A right of action in contract, which an action on an insurance
policy would normally be, will not be severable into two distinct
causes of action, one accruing prior to bankruptcy and one accruing
after bankruptcy. A single breach gives rise to but a single cause
of action accruing prior to bankruptcy and therefore vesting in
the trustee. Unless there is some compelling policy reason why
the cause of action should not accrue until the full extent of
the injury can be ascertained, the bankrupt will not have standing
to sue. To hold otherwise would allow a new right of action for
what are merely consequential damages stemming from the
original injury and which are recoverable under the original cause
of action.
In view of this examination, the Reichert court came to the
proper decision that the cause of action on which the bankrupt
brought suit had vested in the trustee in bankruptcy.
HuaH J. HUTCHISON
55. See, e.g., In re Newkirk Min. Co., 238 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1984);
In re Yalden, 109 F. Supp. 603 (D. Mass. 1953); Schram v. Tobias, 40 F.
Supp. 470 (E.D. Mich. 1941); Beck v. Unruh, 37 Cal. 2d 148, 231 P.2d 13
(1951).
56. See, e.g., In re Aldrich's Estate, 35 Cal. 2d 20, 215 P.2d 724 (1950);
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